Paying for a World Class Affiliation: Reputation Laundering in the University Sector of Open Societies by Cooley, Alexander A. et al.
May 2021 • Working Paper
PAYING FOR A 
WORLD CLASS 
AFFILIATION: 
Reputation Laundering  







FoRum INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR DEMOCRATIC  STUDIESNED NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY
Supporting Freedom Around the World
2 NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY  /  INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR DEMOCRATIC STUDIES
PAYING FOR A WORLD CLASS AFFILIATION:  Reputation Laundering in the University Sector of Open Societies
Table of Contents 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
INTRODUCTION 5
BACKGROUND: INDIVIDUAL FOREIGN GIFTS AND  
THE CHALLENGE OF REPUTATION LAUNDERING 8
MECHANISMS FOR REPUTATION LAUNDERING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 10
     Individual Donations for Academic Programs/Schools 
     Invited Speakers and Lecturers 
     Receiving Favorable Admissions Decisions 
FUNDING, LEGAL OBLIGATIONS, AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 16
     U.S. Legal Requirements and Compliance Issues
     Vetting Questions: Guidelines and Scrutiny
SAFEGUARDING INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY AT UNIVERSITIES 18
     Procedural Responses and Internal Changes
     Trends in the United Kingdom
     Trends in the United States
PERSISTENT WEAKNESSES
CONCLUSION AND KEY FINDINGS 23
REFERENCES 26
     Endnotes
     Photo Credits
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 34
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 34
ABOUT THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY  35
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 35
3 NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY  /  INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR DEMOCRATIC STUDIES
PAYING FOR A WORLD CLASS AFFILIATION:  Reputation Laundering in the University Sector of Open Societies
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Modern kleptocracy thrives on the ability of kleptocrats and their associates to use their ill-gotten gains in open settings. This often takes the form of invest-
ing in high-end real estate or other luxury goods, which serves to both obscure the 
corrupt origin of the money and to protect it for future use. But there is also a subtler 
dynamic at play. The use of kleptocratic-linked funding or other forms of engagement 
in open societies to blur the illicit nature and source of the donation serves to laun-
der kleptocrats’ reputations, as well as their cash. This careful cultivation of positive 
publicity and influence empowers autocrats and their cronies. It also entrenches 
kleptocrats—and the regimes with which they are associated—in positions of power.
Universities and think tanks in open settings are prime targets for reputation laun-
dering. The rapid internationalization of the higher education sector, as well as the 
swelling demand worldwide for Western education makes academic institutions 
particularly vulnerable to this form of transnational kleptocratic activity. Indeed, 
over recent years, there has been a major surge of foreign funding to U.S. and U.K. 
universities. The composition of fundraising has also changed. Major gifts comprise 
a growing share of donations, and a relatively small number of wealthy individuals 
contribute nearly 80 percent of gift-giving to universities. 
These challenges also affect other open countries where foreign gifts traditionally 
have not been a major source of funding but are now actively being offered and 
sought. Countries like the Czech Republic and Germany have witnessed high-profile 
scandals involving funding from PRC-connected sources, both in exerting influence 
through opaque payments to faculty or through the application of Chinese law to 
donor agreements with the university. Such examples highlight the transnational 
nature of this challenge.  
Key mechanisms by which individuals can launder their reputations in the higher 
education sector include: 
•  Endowing university programs and institutes as private citizens to garner legal 
standing and support in their country of operation, or to influence the academic 
remit of certain institutions; 
•  Serving as guest speakers or lecturers at high-profile events, thereby having a 
platform from which they can garner positive publicity and present themselves as 
influential philanthropists and leaders; 
•  Gaining preferential admission to academic institutions for themselves, their family, 
and associates, conferring prestige to the donor and creating new networks for 
overseas employment, association, and residence. 
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The risks of kleptocratic funding to U.S. and U.K. universities is taking place at a 
time when several high-profile scandals have forced universities to consider their 
own reputational risks of accepting donations from individuals with unsavory pasts. 
These scandals, alongside the rise in importance and influence of social media 
has promoted positive change. Universities are increasingly aware of the need to 
keep their reputation beyond reproach and have adopted ethical principles and 
expanded review procedures in response to increased media scrutiny. 
Despite the rising awareness of the dangers posed from accepting donations of 
questionable provenance, universities in the U.S. and U.K. face several challenges in 
curbing this trend:
•  Determining whether funds have illicit origins often is not straightforward. Money 
is often laundered so the precise source is obscured. Individuals acting in alliance 
with kleptocrats often claim to be independent from their governments. 
•  Tension between centralized administrations and decentralized faculties of  
universities —where the administrators who solicit and finance the donations  
are separate from the regional experts who understand the country’s political 
context—can making vetting difficult. 
•  Fundamentally, there is little agreement within universities as to what exactly con-
stitutes prohibitive reputational risk and how to mitigate it or recognize red flags. 
Tackling reputation laundering should be a priority for academic institutions. Univer-
sities should conduct due diligence on prospects before beginning negotiations about 
the terms of a particular gift. They should also provide a comprehensive and searchable 
public list of all donations (foreign and domestic) over a specified threshold. In addition, 
higher education institutions should consider making its gift acceptance policy, includ-
ing the ethical guidelines and core principles by which donations are accepted, publicly 
available. In this vein, it would be prudent for universities to encourage institution-wide 
ethics training, regular accountability reviews, and the participation of the student body 
in major endowment decisions. 
Given the struggles U.S. and U.K. universities are experiencing when confronting 
these issues, universities in other open settings are bound to face similar challenges 
in combating these transnational kleptocratic and reputation laundering networks. 
5 NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY  /  INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR DEMOCRATIC STUDIES
PAYING FOR A WORLD CLASS AFFILIATION:  Reputation Laundering in the University Sector of Open Societies
INTRODUCTION: FOREIGN DONATIONS IN HIGHER  
EDUCATION
Over the past two decades, rapid internationalization has been a defining characteris-
tic of the higher education sector’s development in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Universities have established overseas campuses; forged important new part-
nerships with foreign academic institutions, governments, and nongovernmental orga-
nizations; and offered new, internationally-oriented degrees and programs.1 Swelling 
demand worldwide for Western education, including among high-net-worth individuals 
(HNWIs), makes the higher education sector even more attuned to these global trends.2 
These internationalization trends have coincided with a surge of foreign funding to U.S. and 
U.K. universities. From 2007 to 2013, foreign donations—composed of foreign-based gov-
ernmental entities, corporations, foundations, and individuals—contributed directly to U.S. 
colleges and universities, with the ten leading donor countries (including China, Hong Kong, 
and India) providing over $1 billion to academic institutions.3 According to more comprehen-
sive data from the U.S. Department of Education (ED), between 2013 and 2019, the report-
ed total of foreign donations to U.S. universities exceeded $4 billion—though the figure is 
likely significantly higher.4
However, these country-of-origin data do not always capture the foreign origins of gifts 
adequately. As with other globalized entities like multinational corporations, HNWIs, and 
foundations, patrons operate transnationally, co-mingling funds among legal entities 
and across favorable political and tax jurisdictions, thereby blurring distinctions between 
“foreign” and “domestic.” Foreign-based donors actively maintain foundations or U.S.-
based branches or pass-throughs. Most notably, between 2011 and 2014 the Qatar 
Foundation International, a charity registered in Washington, D.C., donated $1.4 billion, 
primarily to six U.S. universities that also operate campuses in the small Gulf state.5 Simi-
larly, one of the largest individual gifts of the past decade—a $350 million gift made to 
Harvard University in 2014 by Ronnie Chan, a dual U.S./Hong Kong national—was made 
through a Massachusetts-based legal entity, even though the gifting organization itself 
received substantial funds transferred from foreign jurisdictions.6 
The U.K. higher education sector has seen similar internationalizing trends. Within the 
past decade, an increase in tuition fees and the ramping-up of development efforts 
have, according to the 2020 CASE-Ross report, led to the near-tripling of philanthropic 
donations received by U.K. and Irish universities (from £0.5 billion to £1.3 billion).7 In the 
United Kingdom, there are no systematic data outlining the country of origin of dona-
tions.8 However, individual schools agree that although the majority of gifts still come 
from U.K. and U.S. donors, fundraising is increasingly internationalized. For example, Ox-
ford University published data that indicate a hundred-fold increase in donations from 
the Middle East between 2001 and 2014, with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), and Qatar accounting for the lion’s share of these amounts.9 Over the late 2000s, 
sources gradually shifted eastward; by 2020, it is estimated that more than one-third of 
overseas funding to U.K. universities came from China.10
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Beyond the actual numerical increases in the total amount of foreign donations, the 
composition of fundraising has also changed. Major gifts comprise a growing share of 
donations. Universities receive, and actively solicit, larger donations from a smaller pool 
of elite donors. According to David Callan, from 2005 to 2015 U.S. colleges and univer-
sities received over 14,000 gifts worth at least $1 million and at least one-hundred gifts 
worth $100 million.11 While the top 1 percent of donors accounted for 64 percent of the 
dollar amount of university giving in 2006, by 2013 this figure increased to 80 percent.12 
In addition, universities have ramped up their foreign outreach and alumni networks, 
as new groups of successful foreign nationals prioritize educational donations as part 
of their philanthropic activity.13 Surveys suggest that education is now the most popu-
lar individual cause for philanthropic giving among global HNWIs and private individual 
foundations.14 For instance, one survey of leading Chinese-American philanthropists in-
dicated that donations to higher education comprised 66 percent of all large gifts (over 
$1 million) made between 2008 and 2014.15
The benefits of internationalization and foreign funding are vital to the development and 
global stature of the U.S. and U.K. higher education institutions. Foreign funders can 
make invaluable long-term investments, especially in endowment income, while expand-
ing international contacts and networks for exchanges among faculty, students, and ad-
ministrators. Raising a university’s international profile can cement a reputation within a 
highly competitive and global higher education landscape. However, the surge in foreign 
funding—especially contributions of large gifts from individual donors—also highlights 
important challenges. Universities in open societies must take greater care to scrutinize 
the origins of these funds. Gifts from foreign sources who are sanctioned, politically 
exposed, or have histories of corrupt business practices might entangle universities 
in legal violations and disputes. Money from tainted sources or funds earned through 
unscrupulous means may damage the reputational standing of a recipient. Moreover, 
even if due diligence can ascertain the origins of the funds, individuals themselves might 
intend to invest or otherwise engage with the university for purposes that run contrary 
to the university’s own principles, values, and ethical code of conduct. This problem is a 
particular concern when foreign individuals and entities engage in reputation launder-
ing—that is, to use their philanthropic donations to universities in rule-of-law settings to 
boost their international reputation and offset reported controversies or malfeasance 
back in their home country.
This report examines how foreign donors may engage with universities in open settings 
to launder their reputations. It draws on primary research as well as publicly available 
secondary data. In a survey of officers in charge of donations at U.K. and U.S. univer-
sities, the authors selected the higher education establishments most likely to attract 
significant funding from potentially illicit sources: the 24 Russell Group universities in the 
United Kingdom, and the Top 20 large U.S. universities as ranked by the 2020 edition of 
US News and World Report. The survey asked the respondents to share their institution’s 
gift acceptance policies and the ways in which these policies have changed in recent 
years. The survey was designed to identify the role of university offices involved in the 
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gift approval process and explain whether gifts are treated differently depending on 
specific criteria. In the United Kingdom, 17 out of the 24 institutions contacted respond-
ed to the survey. In the United States, however, administrators were reluctant to reply 
or did not respond; that said, many of the surveyed institutions when asked were under 
compliance investigation concerning the reporting of foreign funds.16 Although our 
findings are preliminary, they potentially capture similar funding trends and challenges 
confronting institutions of higher education in other open societies such as those of 
Australia, New Zealand, and Europe.
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BACKGROUND: INDIVIDUAL FOREIGN GIFTS AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF REPUTATION LAUNDERING
Numerous recent reports highlight the risk of authoritarian influencing in university or 
think tank settings. These activities are characterized by the use of donations or other 
forms of engagement to shape research and teaching agendas at academic institutions, 
thereby threatening the recipient’s academic integrity.17 These gifts and charitable activ-
ities serve an additional purpose: they launder the reputation of the individual donor. 
Donors who are implicated in acts of corruption, political repression and intimidation, 
suspicious activity, or political malfeasance may use their philanthropic activity to deflect 
attention from their legal issues or whitewash their role in crafting controversial policies. 
Reputation laundering is inherently transnational as it involves the intentional “minimizing 
or obscuring evidence of corruption in an authoritarian’s home country and rebranding 
kleptocrats as engaged global citizens.”18
Reputation laundering can also serve to bolster the standing of an individual’s country 
of origin. For example, according to the New York Times, wealthy Russian oligarchs are 
increasingly influential patrons of the arts in the West, creating significant dilemmas for 
flagship Western cultural organizations. A number of key arts donors were sanctioned 
following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its interference in the 2016 U.S. pres-
idential election campaign.19 A recent Foreign Policy article draws upon a new database 
of philanthropic donations and finds that in recent decades, seven post-Soviet oligarchs 
have together donated between $372 million and $435 million to U.S.-based not-for-profit 
institutions, including universities, museums, cultural centers, and think tanks.20 
Adverse developments in foreign relations and unexpected geopolitical events can also 
invite unwelcome attention on a university’s problematic foreign associations and recast 
the reputation of individual donors and patrons. In one dramatic and pivotal example, 
in 2010, a foundation controlled by then Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi and his 
son Saif Qaddafi pledged a gift of £1.5 million to the Global Governance Centre of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)—only for this gift to come under 
intense scrutiny within and outside the university as political tensions in Libya devolved 
into civil war in 2011. The incident led to the resignation of LSE director Sir Howard 
Davies in early 2011 and prompted an independent investigation that criticized the uni-
versity for “a disconcerting number of failures in communications and governance within 
the school.”21 It was later revealed that LSE had conducted minimum due diligence con-
cerning the donation and that Saif Qaddafi—who had been awarded a doctoral degree 
in philosophy from the university in 2008—may have plagiarized his thesis.22 Similarly, in 
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Khashoggi in 2018 in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology (MIT) undertook a review of its relationships with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
as senior Saudi government officials were implicated in Khashoggi’s death.23 These and 
other scandals force universities to reckon with how much favorable treatment is given 
to individuals who provide large donations and what the procedures should be for re-
viewing their gifts and roles. In terms of dealing with foreign donations, when elites from 
authoritarian countries seek to aggrandize their reputations through engagement in 
higher education, university reputations become intertwined with those of the donor. 
Protesters opposed to Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi demonstrate outside of the London School of Economics (LSE) as  
Seif al-Islam Alqadhafi (unseen), son of Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi, delivers a speech in London on May 25, 2010.
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MECHANISMS FOR REPUTATION LAUNDERING IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION
When considering the potential, pernicious effects of donations—foreign and domes-
tic—in higher education, universities are usually concerned about the origins of these 
gifts and their potential to grant donors undue influence on university operations and 
governance. Universities routinely consider the history and origins of the wealth of 
individual benefactors, including whether they might be politically exposed persons or 
whether their business or financial dealings have been called into question. Certain elite 
universities will scrutinize potential donors who have no previous ties to the university 
more carefully than alumni. At the same time, ensuring university autonomy in how to 
administer and spend the donation is considered a best practice, even while the donor 
is acknowledged or even celebrated. 
A common fundraising practice is to solicit gifts from individuals to endowed funds for 
named faculty chairs or naming rights on buildings. Universities usually have endowed chair 
policies (e.g., minimum amount, approval process, and benefactor’s advisory role) designed 
to ensure that the position meets the terms of the benefactor while allowing freedom or 
selection and academic independence of the chair holder. Naming rights for buildings 
usually require the most substantial gifts, but usually solicit the greatest scrutiny—especially 
because of their implied permanence. These investments can be questioned at a later date 
should the reputation of the chair donor be tarnished, or general social norms shift against 
practices associated with benefactors, making their naming legacies no longer desirable or 
acceptable.24
Questions of due diligence and influence are important, but they may not always filter 
or deter reputation laundering. Association with a prestigious university—in the form 
of a high-profile gift, honorary degree, or speaking engagement—confers international 
legitimacy and status to donors, especially for charities and foundations that are funded 
by individuals and carry their names. Some of these risks include appearing to condone 
the governing practices and repressive policies of a donor’s regime or home nation; 
associating the university with comments or beliefs previously expressed by the donor; 
and implicating the university in ongoing litigation or criminal investigations involving 
the donor, including court proceedings related to libel cases (in the case of the United 
Kingdom) or other schemes designed to enhance their general reputations.
This section presents three pathways through which foreign individuals can wield university 
endowments and engagement as a method of reputation laundering: individual donations 
for academic programs, use of the university as a legitimizing forum for public speeches and 
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Individual Donations for Academic Programs/Schools 
The most high-profile foreign donations are those intended to establish a center or insti-
tute for a particular program or course of study. Providing endowed funds to establish a 
program represents a long-term investment in the university and promotes a certain area 
of research and scholarship. In turn, such investments raise the possibility that, absent in-
dependent university governance or oversight, the donor may exert direct influence over 
the program’s research agenda, publicly stated purpose, and scholarly profile. This risk 
is especially notable for institutions with Middle East or Islamic studies, as the field itself 
might be regarded as controversial or politicized. For example, despite the heavy criticism 
of Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz Alsaud’s major donations in support of 
Islamic Studies at Harvard, Georgetown, Edinburgh, and Cambridge Universities, all of 
these institutions accepted the Prince’s gifts.25 Similar large donations for Islamic Studies 
programs include gifts from Sheikh Sultan bin Mohammed al-Qassimi, ruler of Sharjah, to 
the University of Exeter, and from Sultan Qaboos bin Said, ruler of Oman, to Cambridge.26 
Such donations from members of ruling families or governing elites from autocracies 
can be difficult to evaluate in terms of their net reputational impact. These Islamic study 
centers may indeed function with full autonomy and contribute to fostering intercultural 
understanding. However, if these donations deter academic or public scrutiny of these 
rulers’ policies and governance, then they may erode academic freedom instead.27 
Several Gulf state donors are involved in broader academic partnerships with Western 
universities and research centers, which itself can be regarded as part of a broader 
strategy to raise domestic educational standards and be personally associated with 
internationally recognized institutions of academic excellence. In other cases, major 
gifts for putatively apolitical causes, like public health or medical sciences, are made by 
high-profile individuals of dual nationality, with business ties to China or the former  
Soviet Union, and whose donations and role in think tanks and cultural institutions  
attract public controversy and criticism.28
Beyond the general whitewashing of an individual’s reputation, major donations also can 
be used in legal and criminal proceedings by those who wish to bolster their claims about 
status or residency, and even, rights to legal protections. Consider the case of the Firtash 
Foundation’s gift to Cambridge University. The charity, funded by Ukrainian businessman 
Dmitri Firtash, donated more than £6 million to Cambridge University, two-thirds of which 
was earmarked to establish an endowment for a program of Ukrainian studies, with addi-
tional financial aid to be provided for Ukrainian students completing master’s degrees at 
the university.29 Firtash, however, is a controversial figure. He is suspected of being deeply 
involved in Ukrainian gas trading schemes and maintaining what U.S. authorities charac-
terize as close ties to organized crime syndicates.30 In 2011, the head of the School of Arts 
and Humanities at the University of Cambridge praised Firtash’s contributions both online 
and at a public dinner in 2013.31 Six months later, Firtash was indicted by a U.S. federal 
grand jury for allegedly participating in an international racketeering operation; his extra-
dition request from Vienna remains pending.32 A spokesman for Cambridge revealed that 
a subsequent £1.95 million donation from Firtash had been frozen pending the resolution 
of legal proceedings.33 Firtash denies any wrongdoing, maintaining that these allegations 
are politically motivated because of his ties to the Kremlin. 
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A senior faculty member in Ukrainian Studies at the University of Cambridge defended the 
donations, arguing that Firtash had no influence in how the funds would be implement-
ed.34 However, the donations brought Firtash acclaim and a wave of positive publicity. In 
2012, he received the University of Cambridge Chancellor’s 800th Anniversary Campaign 
Medal for Outstanding Philanthropy, an honor that reportedly he displayed proudly on 
his charity’s website.35 Furthermore, Firtash also appears to have used the donations to 
garner legal standing and support in U.K. courts to pursue legal action against the daily 
newspaper Kyiv Post. He sought to bring charges against the newspaper for libel, after the 
publication published an article about his allegedly illicit business dealings in Ukraine.36 
The lawsuit noted that Firtash had given “a major gift . . . to the University to endow 
Cambridge Ukrainian Studies, part of the Dept of Slavonic Studies, and establish two 
permanent academic posts. The initiative is recorded as having met with strong student 
and public interest in Great Britain.” Ultimately, the lawsuit was dismissed in 2011, with 
the judge ruling that Firtash did not have substantial ties to the United Kingdom. Still, the 
endowment clearly bolstered Firtash’s reputation and standing within British society.37
Invited Speakers and Lecturers
A second category of possible reputation laundering lies in the act of universities giving 
a speaking platform or other invitations to attend university-sponsored events. Uni-
versities must consider carefully to whom their platforms should be granted when 
developing public programming and inviting guest speakers and lecturers. Certain 
invitations, however, become instances of reputation laundering when visiting speakers 
are presented as global philanthropists or transnational public figures, overlooking their 
controversial or compromised standing in their home countries.
For example, in 2009, Rice University invited the president of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro 
Obiang Nguema Mbasago to address the university. Nguema, Africa’s longest-serving 
ruler, has been accused of grand corruption and dictatorial repression throughout his 
political career. However, the public program for his address described him in glowing 
terms, ignoring the severe criticism his regime faces from human rights advocates and 
anticorruption watchdogs:
Since the discovery of substantial oil and natural gas reserves in the mid- to 
late-1990s, Obiang’s government has made significant investments in increasing 
transparency in its financial practices and diversifying its economy, modernizing 
its infrastructure, strengthening its public health system, and promoting educa-
tion to build a strong foundation for the future of the country. . . . Obiang has 
also made a strategic decision to focus on diversifying the national economy to 
ensure successful long-term stabilization.38 
More recently, in 2018 Isabel dos Santos, the daughter of Angola’s former longstanding 
president and chair of Angola’s state-owned oil giant Sonangol, was invited to speak at 
Yale University by its Undergraduate Association for African Peace and Development.39  
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clarifying statement that the invitation was not intended as an endorsement.40 However, 
dos Santos’ appearance at Yale was one in a series of university engagements that pro-
moted her reputation as a young, female business leader focused on African develop-
ment.41 She came under increased international scrutiny with the publication in 2020 of 
the “Luanda Leaks,” an extensive International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) 
investigation that explored how a plethora of relationships with Western enablers helped 
dos Santos amass and hide her fortune.42 In the wake of the Luanda Leaks revelations, 
dos Santos reportedly utilized her network and public relations services in the United 
Kingdom and elsewhere to safeguard her reputation.43 
Recent cases at U.K. universities attest to reputation laundering’s wider ecosystem. In 
2012, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev was invited to Cambridge to give 
a speech on his country’s progress and stability.44 This invitation came mere months 
after his security forces gunned down peaceful protestors in the oil town of Zhanaozen, 
and despite his regime’s kleptocratic nature. Nazarbayev’s address was part of a wider 
international influencing and reputation laundering campaign, involving members of 
the British royal family and former senior British government figures, including former 
Conservative minister Jonathan Aitken and former Prime Minister Tony Blair. The same 
Isabel dos Santos speaks at the Yale Undergraduate Association for African Peace & Development.
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year, Cambridge’s Churchill College was forced to abandon plans for a “Nazarbayev 
Fellowship” funded by the Kazakhstan branch of the financial services company Price-
waterhouseCoopers after it was accused of reputation laundering. A spokesperson for 
the college noted that the fellowship title referred to the university in Kazakhstan named 
after the president, not the man himself, arguing that it was “not the college’s intention 
to celebrate President Nazarbayev in making this appointment.”45
The difficult question for universities is where to draw the line—at mere rumors, at more sub-
stantiated allegations or indictments, or at the proven conviction of the prospective speaker?
Receiving Favorable Admissions Decisions 
The linkages between individual gifts and donations that earn benefactors, their family mem-
bers, and associates preferential admission into academic institutions are also key areas 
where donor intentions deserve further scrutiny. Investigative studies of leading universities 
demonstrate that elite universities maintain “development lists” of applicants from families of 
wealthy alumni and other actual and potential donors routinely, for whom admission criteria 
might be less stringent than the regular applicant pool.46 Strictly speaking, this pathway may 
be more of a transactional form of corruption than an overt method of reputation launder-
ing. Still, university admission and affiliation confer prestige to the donor’s family, and “pay 
to play” arrangements are critical to the global standing of these individuals, offering new 
networks for overseas employment, association, and residence. 
Former President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev meets with Cambridge University faculty and staff in 2012.
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The 2019 U.S. college admis-
sions scandals exposed not 
only the privilege granted to 
wealthy contributors, but also 
the critical role transnational 
networks of “fixers” play in col-
luding with university admin-
istrators and athletic coaches 
to gain favorable admissions 
decisions for domestic and for-
eign wealthy donors.47 In one 
notorious instance, Chinese 
pharmaceuticals billionaire 
Tao Zhao donated a significant 
amount of money to Stanford 
University and reportedly 
paid admissions consultant 
William “Rick” Singer—who 
was indicted and later pleaded 
guilty to bribery, mail fraud, 
and money laundering—a 
sum of $6.5 million for his 
services.48 Zhao’s daughter 
was admitted to Stanford 
University as a recruit for the 
school’s sailing team, despite her lack of any prior athletic record in competitive sailing.49 The 
Zhao family maintains that they were “misled” by Singer and that their contribution to the 
university was intended as an “ordinary donation,” unrelated to their daughter’s admission.50 
Following the scandal, the Los Angeles Times conducted an additional investigation into Qatari 
prince Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s academic career at the University of 
Southern California (USC). It found that “a billionaire trustee arranged a meeting between 
the university president and the prince’s mother,” and that the institution gave the prince 
“special treatment,” going to “extraordinary lengths to keep him happy” including by “forging 
documents” and “flouting university rules.”51 The story also details how the prince’s enablers, 
prior to his admission, intimated the Qatar Foundation’s willingness to provide major dona-
tions to prestigious universities. Ultimately, these grants never materialized.
Study interviewees from U.S. universities confirmed that the admissions scandal carries 
significant ripple effects across the country’s academic landscape, highlighting the link be-
tween admissions and the contributions of wealthy or legacy donors. Although no admin-
istrators were willing to go on the record with these comments, several mentioned that 
some universities were known to have thresholds for foreign donations that would all but 
guarantee admission to the donor’s persons of interest. Moreover, the U.S. Department of 
Justice investigation revealed the growing role of transnational fixers who informally offer 
their services to overseas clients, which include targeting gifts and donations to Western 
universities in exchange for admissions.
College Admissions Consultant William “Rick” Singer was indicted on bribery, mail fraud, and 
money laundering charges.
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FUNDING, LEGAL OBLIGATIONS, AND REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS
Universities in the United States have certain federal- and state-level legal obligations 
to report foreign endowments and ensure that they do not accept donations that are 
the result of ill-gotten gains or from individuals who are subject to sanctions or ongoing 
criminal proceedings. There is no such obligation in the United Kingdom or many other 
democracies, but the publication of the value and provenance of foreign donations is a 
key demand of a recent high-profile campaign for a code of conduct on academic free-
dom and internationalization in the United Kingdom.52 Even if an individual is not formally 
sanctioned or designated as a politically exposed person, accepting large, publicized gifts 
from individuals mired in controversy can undercut a university’s commitment to promote 
ethical governance. Although most universities have checks to ensure that gifts are not 
used for money laundering, the threat of reputation laundering is more difficult to identify, 
assess, and manage in a systematic fashion. 
U.S. Legal Requirements and Compliance Issues
In the United States, federal law imposes some disclosure on higher education for ac-
cepting donations from foreign sources. The chief among these is compliance with the 
Higher Education Act (1965, amended in 1998; sec. 117, also 20 U.S.C., 1011f), which 
requires that all contracts with foreign donors and gifts over $250,000 in value be 
reported to the U.S. Department of Education (ED). Recent attempts to enforce compli-
ance with federal law suggest that the act was neglected routinely, both by universities 
that do not comply with its reporting requirements and by federal authorities that fail to 
issue up-to-date compliance guidance. A February 2019 report from the Subcommittee 
on Investigations of the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee 
about the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) influence on American higher education 
found that U.S. universities “routinely” failed to report foreign gifts as required by law.53 
When addressing the reporting requirement concerning Confucius Institutes, the report 
found that the PRC’s education ministry provided $158 million to nearly 100 colleges 
and universities, but nearly 70 percent of those that received donations greater than 
$250,000 had failed to report as required.54
In response to this congressional activity, the ED opened a compliance investigation into 
at least a dozen universities, including Harvard and Yale.55 In addition to Chinese fund-
ing, the ED also requested information about donations from Saudi Arabia, Russia, and 
Qatar explicitly. A review of initial reporting documents by the Wall Street Journal stated 
that, in total, these universities failed to disclose about $6.5 billion in foreign donations 
from these aforementioned countries.56 In its October 2020 report, the ED learned that 
Yale University underreported its gifts and contracts by $375 million, after university 
officials admitted previously that the university did not submit reports on foreign gifts 
from 2014 to 2017.57 It also identified a university—Cornell University according to 
the Wall Street Journal—that failed to document $760 million in funding for the whole 
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university, recounting that “university officials chose the word “dumbfounded” to explain 
this reporting error and provided no explanation.”58 The report also noted that Harvard 
“appears to possess inadequate institutional controls over its foreign donations and 
contracts” and admonished Stanford for adopting a policy of not documenting individual 
foreign donor names since 2010, finding that it only reported $64 million in anonymous 
Chinese donations.59 
During these recent investigations, universities have maintained that specific guidance 
about precise disclosure and reporting procedures was ill-defined. In January 2019, the 
American Council on Education sent a letter notifying the ED that it had not issued any 
guidance on the reporting requirement, including requests for precise determinations 
of how the $250,000 disclosure threshold is calculated, what types of institutions are 
obligated to report large donations, and the level of detail necessary about ascertaining 
the identity of a foreign donor.60 In a February 2019 follow-up, the American Council on 
Education expressed particular concern about demands from the ED to disclose the 
names and addresses of individual foreign donors who had requested anonymity.61
At the individual level, researchers who have accepted federal funds—including from 
the National Science Foundation or National Institutes for Health—require that grant 
recipients disclose all current sources of support for projects and proposals, as well as 
information concerning foreign financial interests and ties.62 They may also be subject to 
university disclosure guidelines and periodic conflict of interest certifications.
Vetting Questions: Guidelines and Scrutiny
Beyond complying with federal and state rules and reporting requirements, as well as ensur-
ing that they do not accept foreign funds from illicit or prohibited sources, universities must 
also confront the challenge of vetting potential donors who endow or otherwise strategically 
engage with the university for purposes of reputation laundering. Here, there are no stan-
dard guidelines or procedures, especially given that each university interprets its own “rep-
utational risk” differently. Often, universities may not consider acts of intentional reputation 
laundering by individual donors and their agents to be potentially damaging to their own 
institutional reputations. When dealing with an individual donor from overseas, academic  
institutions often find themselves at a disadvantage to secure accurate and timely informa-
tion about the individual’s history, business practices, and possible motives for engagement.
That said, one point was emphasized in almost all study interviews: scrutiny over associa-
tions can change dramatically, as new scandals, media attention, and changes in domestic 
political climates recast relationships with donors or university affiliates. These changes can 
happen suddenly. Media stories about universities accepting questionable gifts, in the wake 
of scandals involving figures like Saif Qaddafi, can inflict severe reputational damage and 
plunge universities into a public relations crisis. Scandals of questionable associations are 
amplified by social media attention. Crises that trigger backlash from current students and 
mobilize alumni campaigns may elevate the issue to the higher levels of university leadership 
and discourage more significant donations. Given the renewed scrutiny of the higher educa-
tion sector, reputation management scandals in any one university damage the reputation 
of academic institutions across the board.
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SAFEGUARDING INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY  
AT UNIVERSITIES
The exposure of financial misconduct in higher education institutions, alongside the 
rise in importance and influence of social media networks, has prompted some positive 
changes. Prestigious universities are increasingly aware of the need to keep their repu-
tation beyond reproach and they have adopted ethical principles and expanded review 
procedures in response to increased media scrutiny. Most notably, the LSE’s Qaddafi 
case spurred change in donation review processes across the U.K. academic landscape. 
Several university gift managers interviewed for this study cited the 2011 Lord Henry 
Woolf inquiry report on the LSE’s links with Libya as a “catalyst” for changes in their 
donation regulations and procedures.63 More recently, the substantial gifts made by 
financier and convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein to elite US universities made waves 
in the United States.64 Seemingly driven by the need to avoid similar reputational dam-
age, U.S. institutions began to reassess the way they solicit, supervise, and accept such 
philanthropic contributions. 
However, many challenges remain, as scandals continue to emerge on both sides of the 
Atlantic. This section, based on primary research encompassing written responses from 
eighteen leading U.K. and U.S. universities and semistructured interviews with thirteen 
university officers, gives an overview of the institutional procedures; the changes over the 
past decade; and a comparison of U.S. and U.K. trends, existing problems, and possible 
areas for improvement.65
Procedural Responses and Internal Changes 
Traditionally, universities received donations by tapping into their body of alumni, 
though this custom was more present in the United States than in the United Kingdom, 
and in the English-speaking world more than elsewhere. Changes that occurred over the 
past few decades, on both sides of the Atlantic, were driven by the increasing interna-
tionalization of the student body and universities’ professional scope and network, in-
cluding through the establishment of campuses abroad. This development pushes high-
er education institutions to look beyond national borders for funding. The expansion of 
professional degree-granting schools and programs includes accompanying, dedicated 
development offices that seek to tap into transnational networks of sector professionals, 
alumni, and acquaintances directly. Furthermore, the recent “marketization” of the high-
er education sector has spurred competition to attract students and donors, prompting 
the scaling-up and professionalization of fundraising, including expanding the pool of 
prospective donors beyond the university’s alumni. 
The imperative to attract ever larger sums of money from and for an increasingly interna-
tional audience exposes university development offices to numerous challenges. Admin-
istrations now deal with donors who are less familiar to them, may not have previous 
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university connections, and may be interested in using their gift to earn publicity or bolster 
their domestic and international reputation. International donors often have backgrounds 
that are more difficult to check, necessitating development offices to become proficient 
in foreign languages (especially Mandarin) and build networks of development officers 
and overseas alumni who can assist in the vetting of prospects. This tendency prompts 
increased concerns; as one UK interviewee said, “when you stray away too much from the 
Western hemisphere, information becomes impossible to get to.” Even with increasingly 
sophisticated measures to unearth information about potential donors such as social 
media profiles, some interviewees admitted that there could be a silver lining to the lack 
of information: “This is a disadvantage and an advantage, because [in the case of adverse 
publicity repercussions] we can say that we honestly did not know.”
In addition to qualms over the source of funding, apprehension toward authoritarian 
influence through philanthropic activity recently has attracted more scrutiny.66 Despite 
these common ethical and security concerns, there is currently no standard procedure 
or institutional configuration for conducting due diligence for universities. Trends in the 
United Kingdom and the United States present noteworthy similarities and differences. 
Trends in the United Kingdom
Although philanthropic donations lack specific statutory provisions under U.K. law, elite 
British universities are no less aware of the need for screening donations than those in the 
United States. Following a tide of criticism from government, parliament, and the media 
regarding authoritarian influence, the professional association Universities U.K. (UUK) has 
published a “Security Guidelines for Universities” study.67 The range of issues included in the 
UUK report goes well beyond that of foreign gifts; it addresses the protection of foreign fac-
ulty and students, the academic integrity of research, the protection of intellectual property, 
the safety of fieldwork, and the integrity of foreign campuses. Given that public attention 
is heightened, U.K. universities seem keen to demonstrate their awareness of this issue by 
cooperating with this report’s research. 
The risk here is that the British government will follow the lead of the United States and 
Australia and impose top-down solutions that limit institutional autonomy and academic 
freedom without increasing transparency or accountability. An alternative for the U.K. is 
the widespread but voluntary adoption by universities of a code of conduct, such as that 
published in draft form by the Academic Freedom and Internationalization Working Group 
(AFIWG), of which two of the authors are members, in October 2020.68 The AFIWG’s code 
requires universities, inter alia, to: 
Make all MoUs and summary information on all foreign gifts/donations public, 
and include a section in [an] annual report on the operation of the MoUs and 
any other foreign gifts/donations, with specific reference to academic freedom 
risks that have arisen or are on-going and how these are being mitigated; and 
further undertake, in connection with any such funding arrangements, not to 
enter into non-disclosure agreements.69 
Such transparency is wholly lacking at present in the U.K.
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According to the U.K. responses received, gifts to universities are typically handled by 
an office in charge of development and (occasionally) of alumni relations, in conjunction 
with some form of advisory body (for example, a Gift Review Committee) that reviews 
the largest or riskiest donations. The thresholds for conducting due diligence and for 
determining the level of oversight required vary greatly from one institution to anoth-
er. Minor gifts usually are subject to a risk-based approach, midsize gifts require the 
approval of a head of department, and larger donations are often subject to a review by 
senior university officers or by a high-level committee. 
The scrutiny to which gifts are subject differs depending on the donation’s provenance. 
Donations coming from the post-Soviet space often are treated with an added degree 
of caution, especially after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. Indeed, several university 
officers indicated that gift committees were influenced by events in the news that po-
tentially could create reputation management risks. Furthermore, donations from China 
increasingly are becoming a matter of concern for university administrators. Again, how-
ever, there is no overarching rule in how to assess country risk. Some universities have 
developed “heatmaps” based on external indicators, such as Transparency Internation-
al’s CPI; other institutions consider committee decisions and previous experience; while 
others operate on a purely case-by-case basis. 
Most U.K. universities stated that they conduct the due diligence internally, using open-
source data. In most cases, university research officers could count on at least one paid-
for software used to detect the ownership of any assets as well as connections among 
companies and individuals. Some of the bigger institutions also employ external services 
on occasion to conduct background checks, especially in cases that require specific lan-
guage skills or are highly complex. The length of the process varies wildly, depending on 
the provenance, size, and nature of the gift. Larger universities highlight the importance 
of starting the process early and conducting screenings twice: once at the beginning of 
the relationship with a potential donor and again when the gift is formally put forward. 
When asked how many gifts were formally rejected for failing to comply with ethical 
guidelines, universities reported low numbers, ranging from no rejections at all to a max-
imum of four rejections over the past year. The interviewees attributed the reason for 
the low number of rejections to the protracted process in place: if a prospective donor 
is found to be clearly not aligned with the university’s values, the decision not to proceed 
with the relationship would be taken before even being brought before the high-level 
gift approval committee.
 
Institutions that have an established history and track record in attracting donations can 
usually count on a dedicated gift management/acceptance team with a well-developed 
checklist and set of procedures—a luxury not shared by smaller or less established 
institutions. In all cases, universities indicate that discussions and changes are ongoing 
in this area, thus clearly underlining the fluidity of the subject as well as its timeliness. 
Interestingly, most U.K. interviewees were convinced that the regulations present in U.K. 
institutions are much more stringent than those in vogue in the United States. 
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Trends in the United States 
Given U.S. federal and state foreign reporting requirements, university development is 
one of many academic institutional offices and functions that must manage compliance 
with laws and regulations. The reporting burden (tallying the sum of foreign gifts, con-
tracts, and grants) usually falls on the general counsel’s office, which coordinates with 
offices of development or alumni affairs, institutional funding, and expert controls. Of 
the leading twenty universities as ranked by the 2020 US News and World Report, twelve 
list university fundraising, development, or gift acceptance policies publicly on their web-
sites; although two appear to display these for their own communities, behind password 
protection or other internal means. Out of these twelve, only three mention ethical 
guidelines and only one addresses donations from non-U.S. sources. Interestingly, two 
universities each maintain an explicit giving page for international donors along with the 
contact information of a development officer responsible for international gifts. 
These publicly-facing policies rarely mention due diligence or source vetting. For the 
most part, they discuss financial procedures and accounting of gifts or thresholds for 
various types of endowments. At best, they may explicitly mention how to deal with 
conflicts of interests in directly sponsored research. Decision-making processes and 
principles guiding acceptance or denial of donations from individuals remain mostly 
undisclosed or internal to each institution.
Transparency about the origin and size of donations is also a challenge for most univer-
sities. Contacts and discussions with donors can be sensitive and competitive, leading 
to confidential meetings and negotiations between donors (or their representatives) 
and university administrators. But a few universities appear to have adopted a “gold 
standard” policy of making information about all university gifts and donations publicly 
searchable via their websites. Donations made to universities anonymously is an in-
creasingly thorny issue. Although tolerated—even welcomed—in the past, compliance 
now necessitates that at least a small group of university representatives ascertain the 
exact identity of the donor prior to accepting the gift.
Another important dimension is the level of guidance and training given to gifts and 
development officers about reputational risk and vetting potential prospects. Universi-
ties may provide briefings and standardized materials for all development officers and 
professionals, but given that a single university can employ hundreds of development 
officers across dozens of autonomous schools and units, delegation issues and poten-
tial principal-agent problems—when one individual is authorized to make decisions 
that affect the institution as a whole—pose risks. Furthermore, while some universities 
mandate that each officer must address a standard list of questions for each prospect, 
others prefer to allow officers the discretion for minimizing risk as they cultivate pros-
pects. Although large-scale gifts are vetted centrally in all cases, non-major gifts to U.S. 
universities can still reach up to $250,000 without being rigorously scrutinized.
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One trend is clear: universities have serious concerns about reputational risk, but there 
is little agreement as to what exactly constitutes prohibitive “reputational risk” and how 
to mitigate it or recognize red flags. However, there is now a broad consensus that the 
status of named rights, honorary degrees, and university affiliations is subject to current 
events and may be susceptible to rapid change or revocation. Thus, reputational man-
agement is not just a one-time vetting process, but a recurring concern for evaluation.
Persistent Weaknesses
What, therefore, are the obstacles for the higher education sector to improve their rules 
for uniform, consistent acceptance of philanthropic donations? The susceptibility to me-
dia trends, of which many interviewees spoke openly, is one area of concern. This issue 
raises the question of whether gift approval policies constitute a consistent approach 
based on solid ethical and moral values, or whether they are open to influences from 
external factors. The research conducted for this paper suggests that the latter factor—
the logics of consequence—is still a stronger motivator for conducting due diligence 
than logics of appropriateness.
Among the additional challenges, there is also a marked difference in standards: what 
is defined as a “large gift” deserving of heightened scrutiny varies drastically between 
smaller and larger institutions, and between the United Kingdom and the United States. 
By way of comparison, some lesser-known universities among the United Kingdom’s 
Russell Group have reported that they consider any gift above £10,000 as a “large gift,” 
therefore necessitating a stringent process of due diligence. For some U.S. Ivy League 
universities, by contrast, this figure stands at $10 million and above. While smaller uni-
versities may be wary of gifts that are relatively smaller than those offered to “big shot” 
universities, they also may be penalized because they do not have the resources for a 
dedicated professional donor review team.
Practically speaking, donor research done by alumni relations and development staff is 
often guided by solicitation etiquette and designed to develop engagement and stew-
ardship strategies, rather than to investigate sources of wealth. Moreover, gift review 
committees are tasked primarily with protecting the legal interests of the university, con-
sidering conflicts of interest, and only occasionally managing the university’s reputation. 
These operating procedures leave gray areas for accepting donations from questionable 
or unreputable sources. Committee members ultimately may face significant pressure 
to not get in the way of a potential large gift.
A final significant challenge, mentioned by many respondents (and affecting large, de-
centralized universities in particular), appears to be the need to implement the ethical 
precepts across the whole institution. As a consequence of not being able to control 
all members of their faculty, university officers state, there might be cases in which a 
“rogue academic” makes a bad call in accepting some form of association, speaking 
engagement, or donation from a dubious source. Whether this “bad apple” argument is 
a sufficient and satisfactory alibi to explain the persistent issues in this field remains to 
be seen. 
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CONCLUSION AND KEY FINDINGS
The question of improper foreign influence on higher education must be understood 
in terms of the broader contours of reputation laundering across private and public 
sectors. As internationalized institutions behave increasingly like their corporate coun-
terparts, universities are keen to safeguard their own reputations while remaining open 
for business. Moreover, many of today’s funders are not merely individual, politically 
exposed persons, but companies and the states with which they are associated, blurring 
the distinction between reputation laundering, authoritarian influencing, and commer-
cial interests. The controversy concerning the use of Huawei technology at many uni-
versities exemplifies this complexity: The image of Chinese elites, the preferences of the 
Chinese Communist Party, and the investments of a putatively private Chinese company 
are all at stake. The opaqueness of gifts and the means by which they come about—
both in the United Kingdom, where transparency is almost entirely lacking, and in the 
United States, where institutions are required but sometimes fail to publish itemized 
data—makes universities all the more subject to suspicion. Increasingly, students in 
both countries have been voicing their concerns on this matter, by raising the issues of 
transparency and potential complicity with authoritarian regimes in hard-hitting articles 
in their institution’s student newspapers.70
Although this paper addresses some of the issues and trends in foreign gifts and repu-
tation laundering in the United States and the United Kingdom, we invite researchers to 
explore the issues as they are impacting higher education in other democracies where 
similar vulnerabilities may be present. Though much remains to be done in the realm of 
transparency, U.S. and U.K. administrators have been responding to pressure for dis-
closure and media reporting by establishing vetting and diligence procedures, however 
imperfect they may be. These challenges are just as likely to impact other open countries 
where foreign gifts traditionally have not been a major source of funding but are now 
actively being offered and sought. In recent years, countries such as the Czech Republic 
and Germany have witnessed high-profile scandals involving funding from China, both in 
exerting influence through opaque payments to faculty or through the application of PRC 
law to the contract.71
The core problem here appears to be one of nondisclosure: the lack of transparency 
about reporting gifts and absence of institutionalized accountability about the process 
of scrutinizing them. Such openness must begin within universities; staff and students 
should be involved in the process of decision making about gifts before they have been 
accepted. In the United Kingdom, members of the faculty and student bodies may be 
coopted onto the gifts committee from their positions as elected senators and guild 
officers. Gifts accepted must then be reported to a public body and published with 
sufficient detail to discern relationships between individual donors and recipient depart-
ments in all instances, except those where the case for anonymity has been accepted 
by the committee. In the United States, public reporting is a legal requirement, but its 
adherence and enforcement is inadequate owing to the compartmentalization and pro-
fessionalization of development offices and the absence of clear ED guidance. 
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This report offers the following recommendations to universities:
 •  Conduct due diligence on prospects before entering into negotiations concerning the 
terms of a particular gift. University representatives should ascertain the following:
-	 m  The donor’s identity, including the ultimate beneficial owner of any legal 
entity donors.
- 
-	 m The donor’s citizenship/residency.
- 
-	 m Whether the donor is on sanctions or other law enforcement watchlists.
- 
-	 m  Whether the donor is a politically exposed person requiring enhanced due 
diligence.
- 
-	 m The source of funds used to make the proposed donation.
- 
-	 m  Involvement of the donor in current legal proceedings, or any criminal  
history or allegations linked to the donor.
- 
-	 m Negative news media coverage.
 •  Provide a comprehensive and searchable public list of all donations (foreign and 
domestic) over a modest threshold (£10,000/$15,000), including the identity of donor, 
the amount, and major stipulations.
 •  Make the university’s gift acceptance policy, including the ethical guidelines and core 
principles for all donations publicly available.
 •  Mandate annual ethical training for all development officers, even if due diligence is 
not a formal part of their portfolios.
 •  Adopt a formal policy of refusing to consider donations from a donor, foreign or 
domestic, whose family member or associate is currently in the admissions process.
 •  As part of efforts to enhance accountability, create a mechanism, such as a committee 
or petition procedure, through which university associates and interested outside par-
ties can file a request for the university to review its association with a specific donor 
on ethical grounds or provide new information regarding the donor’s reputation.
 •  Empower the student body to keep these problems in check, by providing an open 
space for debate, supporting student newspapers and student-led public events, and 
thus recognizing the crucial role students play in enhancing accountability in higher 
education. 
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Universities are foreign policy actors; they exercise judgments about who they work with 
and from whom they accept money. In a highly competitive environment and with little 
dedicated capacity or incentive to conduct due diligence, the implementation of their pol-
icies in practice is driven by the vicissitudes of geopolitics. In such environments, scandals 
such as the Qaddafi-LSE connection erupt where events make a preexisting relationship 
suddenly unacceptable. As a result, reactiveness often is the default position; more proac-
tive stands on ethics are rare. This situation is not a matter of the absence of policies and 
committees, but rather of the lack of incentives and the uncertain conditions under which 
policies are made and committees formed. University faculty, institutes, and affiliates 
now are at the forefront of important new research into transparency and governance 
networks. As institutions, centers of higher education should also be at the forefront of 
promoting best practices and their supporting norms.
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ENDNOTES 
1.  According to the American Council on Education’s Mapping Internationalization report, 73 percent of U.S. 
institutions reported partnerships with academic institutions outside of the United States, 34 percent 
with NGOs, 17 percent with foreign governments, and 12 percent with corporations. American Council 
on Education (ACE), Mapping Internationalization on U.S. Campuses (Washington, DC: ACE, 2017), 24  
(Figure 16), www.acenet.edu/Documents/Mapping-Internationalization-2017.pdf. 
2.  According to the 2016 Knight Frank survey, ultra high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs) globally were, from 
2006 to 2015, on average 76 percent more likely to send their children overseas for education. Knight 
Frank, The Wealth Report: The Global Perspective on Prime Property and Investment (London: Knight Frank, 
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